




The Media and Ethno-Sectarian Dynamics in Iraq
Dr Ibrahim Al-Marashi1
The Role of Media and Conﬂict
Media institutions have the capability of affecting vast audiences and in a time of conﬂict, they become impor-
tant actors, on par with the actual combatants themselves. Media outlets have the potential of being one of 
the most powerful tools in increasing awareness of ethno-sectarian divisions in deeply divided societies, and 
they also have the potential to shape and inﬂuence public attitudes in overcoming tensions in such societies.
The media can play a role in transmitting hostility, whether it is between states, or ethnic and sectarian groups 
and can exacerbate tensions by spreading misperceptions or exaggerations.
The constructive transformation of a conﬂict can only occur if it affects the mentalities of either an individual or
a society, and the media can play a role in this transformation, by building conﬁdence between the parties and
challenging the misperceptions. However, this is the exception rather than the norm. While the literature on 
media and conﬂict focuses primarily on the role of media in covering conﬂict, or the role of media in exacerbat-
ing conﬂict, there is an emerging literature on how media can resolve conﬂicts. Such studies offer framework
on how to examine the role of that media plays in ethnic conﬂict, and can be applied to analyzing the potential
of the media in heightening or easing ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq.
The Case of Iraq
The case that most vividly demonstrates the role of media and conﬂict is that of Rwanda. Rwanda illustrates
how the media can become a weapon in a time of conﬂict. In this example, the were four elements present
that led to the rise of a “conﬂict media”: 1) strong ideologies, 2) parties to the conﬂict with control over mass
media, imbued with populism, and demagogy, 3) psychological preparation to hate, and 4) calls to violence.[1] 
In the case of Rwanda, studies of media exacerbating ethnic tensions unfortunately failed to materialize 
prior to the conﬂict and the existing literature has been retrospective in nature. A proactive analysis of the
Iraqi media and its portrayal of ethno-sectarian differences in Iraqi society can isolate whether the media is 
exacerbating cleavages in Iraq, or is it facilitating a positive attitude in bridging the differences between its 
communities.
Observers of the situation in Iraq often predict the nation will face an imminent civil war among ethnic Kurds, 
Turkmens and Arabs, and among the Sunni and Shia Muslim sects. Often such pessimistic forecasts are based 
on mere speculation, ignoring the fact that these three ethnic communities managed to coexist for eighty 
years, dispelling the notion that only Saddam Hussein’s “strong arm tactics” kept the nation united. However, 
the public discourse in Iraq, especially following the March 2006 bombing of a Shia shrine featured the in-
creasing use of ethno-sectarian terminology. While differences had always existed between Iraq’s Arab Shia, 
Sunni and Kurds, such divisions were never discussed openly and were glaringly absent in the Iraqi media that 
emerged after the fall of the Ba’ath government in 2003.
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There are four determining factors within the media system, to ascertain whether it can exacerbate a con-
ﬂict:
1, political context: the rule of law versus despotic authority
2, economic conditions: the media as an autonomous economic organisation or one subject to governmen-
tal control (media as part of the state apparatus
3, quality of journalism: critical and analytic reporting or mere functioning as “stenographers of power” 
using the “language of hate”
4, public attitudes: enlightened democratic traditions or authoritarian value systems. [2] 
In terms of the political context in Iraq, under the Ba’athists the rule of law was determined by Saddam Hus-
sein, who could issue legal decrees at his personal whim, only to change them the next day. In post-Saddam 
Iraq, despotic authority still exists in tribal, religious or ethnic structures. While there are autonomous media 
organizations in Iraq, there are equally, if not more powerful stations subject to control of political factions 
within the Iraqi government, but not directly controlled by the Iraqi state. In terms of quality of journalism, 
critical and analytic reporting are developing in Iraq, yet at the same time, other media outlets do serve as 
the “stenographers of power,” which at this juncture have reserved their use of the “language of hate,” but 
are in a position to employ it in the future. As for public attitudes, enlightened democratic traditions will take 
years to form in Iraq, as the norm in the past was “authoritarian value systems,” and they continue to exist on 
sectarian, ethnic and tribal levels.
While a diversity of opinion in Iraq is a positive sign since the fall of the Ba’ath, when there were only ﬁve
state owned dailies and a single government channel, it appears that the post-war Iraqi media is forming along 
ethno-sectarian lines. Powerful media are coalescing around ethno-political groups in Iraq who have print, ra-
dio and TV media at their disposal. Iraqi Kurdish, Turkmen, Arab Sunnis and Arab Shias factions all have their 
own means of communicating to their ethno-sectarian constituencies in Iraq and abroad in the Iraqi diaspora. 
Other independent media with no ethno-sectarian afﬁliation do exist, but do not have access to the funds that
the political parties can provide. The problem of sectarianism reﬂected in the Iraqi media poses a challenge for
other Iraqi media which seek to reﬂect the developments in Iraqi society according to international journalistic
standards.
An examination of the discourse of media outlets during national events that tend to have ramiﬁcations for all
of Iraq’s communities, such as Iraq’s ﬁrst election on January 30, 2005, revealed little tensions between these
groups. As the debates from August 2005 to November 2005 on Iraq’s constitutional process began, where 
the allocation of power and funds were negotiated, the ethno-sectarian discourse grew in intensity. Following 
the bombing of the Shia Al-’Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra in March 2006, the various ethno-sectarian 
media outlets escalated tensions but eventually called for restraint among Iraq’s communities.
However, in the long term, various ethno-sectarian media outlets could prove problematic. Such an arrange-
ment can only further the gap between Iraq’s communities, developing identities along ethno-sectarian lines, 
and weakening any kind of national belonging. The Rwandan genocide was sparked by a single event - the 
assassination of the Rwandan President. If a prominent, charismatic Iraqi religious or ethnic leader were to 
be murdered, this could touch off a similar scenario, mobilizing the targeted community to seek out revenge 
against the other, with the ethno-sectarian media playing a prominent role in a potential conﬂict.
Lessons and Recommendations for Iraq’s Media
The media sector is at a stage where elements of Iraq’s Fourth estate can reinforce its ethno-sectarian divi-
sions and a strategy needs to be developed on how to offer recommendations to counter its employment of 
negative images and stereotypes of other communities.
Bodies have formed in Iraq to create legislation to regulate the media, such as the National Commission on 
Media and Communication and the Iraqi Higher Media Committee. However, media regulation does not solve 
the problem of educating journalists on social responsibility and reporting during times of conﬂict. Education
for media practitioners is crucial, given that that professional standards and practical training for journalists 
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on social responsibility and reporting during times of conﬂict. Education for media practitioners is crucial, given
that that professional standards and practical training for journalists is relatively new in a society that repressed 
its media in the past. Schools of journalism existed in Iraq, but instruction focused on promotion of the views 
of the state Ba’ath Party. Under the circumstances of ethno-sectarian reporting in Iraq, recommendations need 
to be elucidated on how to raise awareness of international standards in journalism to media practitioners.
The activities and recommendations made by scholars, media practitioners and organizations that have been 
involved with developing the media in other conﬂict-ridden societies should be applied to Iraq, whether it is
on behalf of international organization or local institutions in Iraqi itself. Based on past precedents of media 
in deeply-divided societies, there are several lessons for Iraq. International media watch organizations should 
take an interest in monitoring the media in Iraq. There are a plethora of international media organizations that 
can offer training to Iraqi media owners and journalists and recommendations need to be made in order to 
direct these efforts. Finally, policy recommendations can be directed to international organizations that seek to 
address weaknesses in the Iraqi media by offering training and ﬁnancial assistance.
The conﬂict between Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic communities needs to be addressed in the media to serve as a
safety valve for the nation. The key for the future of Iraq’s stability is transforming this debate into a construc-
tive one, with the local media ﬁnding a role in this transformation.
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